19th International Conference of MEEA: "International Trade and Sustainable Development in MENA Region" Piri Reis University, Istanbul. , İstanbul, Türkiye, 9 - 11 Ekim 2020, ss.106-107
Özelleştirmenin Krizi, Krizin Özelleştirilmesi: Türkiye'de Özelleştirme, 2013-2020
Çalışma Türkiye'de özelleştirmelerin son dalgası olan 2013 sonrası dönemi Türkiye ekonomisinin yapısal kriz dinamikleri bağlamında inceliyor. Özellikle bir kriz dinamiği olarak özel sektör dış borç yüküyle özelleştirme politikaları arasındaki ilişkiye yoğunlaşıyor. Türkiye incelediğim bu dönem içerisinde eş zamanlı olarak hem özelleştirmenin krizini hem de krizin özelleştirilmesini yaşıyor. Bir yandan yabancı finansman kısıtı ve kur şokları özelleştirmeleri tıkarken öte yandan Türkiye ilk defa özel sektör borçlarının öncelikli dinamik olduğu bir ekonomik kriz dönemine giriyor. (Bu Türkçe başlık ve kısa özet konferans kitapçığında yer almıyor. Avesis'i ziyaret eden okuyuculara kolaylık olması için Sırrı Emrah Üçer tarafından 11.01.2021 tarihinde kaleme alındı).
Academic studies on privatization does not pay sufficient attention to the fact that privatization projects are also financial projects, in the form of gigantic financing agreements between consortiums and banks. A major obstacle against privatization in peripheral economies is lack of funds in domestic capital markets. This forces an international financial arrangement for privatization. The opposite is also true, as the financial actors of core economies seek and motivate privatization projects as these projects fuel demand for credit in peripheral economies. On the one hand these financial/privatization projects promise increased investment in periphery. On the other hand, such financial arrangements contribute to accumulation of foreign private debt in periphery as a crucial crisis dynamic. The transfer of capital to infrastructure networks is crisis prone and foreign private debt is crisis prone, a double process of crises that trigger each other, crisis of privatization and privatization of crisis. I provide a political economy analysis of crisis of Turkish privatization policy in the context of Turkish economic downturn after 2013, a downturn triggered by over-accumulation of private foreign debt. This analysis has three significant premises – adopting of a broader definition for privatization, handling of privatization policy as a continuum of network policy, and positing privatization in the contexts of peripheral capital dependence and peripheral economic growth and crisis cycles. I adopt a broader definition of privatization that includes Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in addition to projects officially labeled as privatization. Because the official records do not represent the whole picture of arrangements between government, banks, and consortiums that facilitate withdrawal of state and penetration of private investment. The greatest portion of private acquisitions and investments in the last forty years targeted infrastructure networks of telecommunications, energy, transport, and water in peripheral economies. Therefore, analysis of privatization policy is a part of analysis of peripheral network policies. From this perspective, the privatization policy is a phase of network policies in the finance dominated era after 1970s. Shift to a finance dominated global accumulation regime in the 1970s reshaped economic development course of peripheral countries like Turkey. Capital dependence of peripheral economies on core economies through privatization of public debt was the first step. This triggered Debt Crisis of peripheral governments in the early 1980s, a debt crisis that prepared the conditions of withdrawal of state from infrastructure networks. The capital dependence of peripheral economies was fortified after privatization era, as the proportion of private debt in total foreign debt of peripheral economies in the 1980s and 1990s. Asian-Russian-Latin American Crisis of 1997-2001 was a crisis triggered by the dynamic of private foreign debt. A significant proportion of this foreign debt was accumulated through credits issued for network privatizations and following private investments in network. Turkish skepticism towards privatization in specific and foreign investment in general prevented emergence of a similar private debt crisis dynamic. Turkish financial crises like 1994 and 2001 was triggered by public debt instead. However, following the elimination of political and legal obstacles against foreign investment and ownership in the aftermath of 2001 Crisis, there was a boom of Turkish privatization between 2002 and 2013. This boom went hand in hand with the growth of Turkish foreign private debt stock. Following 2013, the economic downturn and crisis was also hand in hand with the Turkish privatization policy’s financing crisis.