On voluntary and efficient allocations


Unveren B.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, cilt.11, 2015 (SSCI İndekslerine Giren Dergi) identifier identifier

  • Cilt numarası: 11 Konu: 2
  • Basım Tarihi: 2015
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1111/ijet.12064
  • Dergi Adı: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY

Özet

A set of sufficiency conditions is presented for Walrasian equilibrium to be equivalent to voluntary and efficient allocations. An important corollary of this equivalence is that voluntary trade in non-clearing markets, which is omnipresent in all market economies, is inefficient. Moreover, our assumptions generalize all the results on the Pareto-efficiency properties of disequilibrium. This generalization also shows that the inefficiency of disequilibrium is germane to the existence of Walrasian equilibrium.