On voluntary and efficient allocations

Unveren B.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, cilt.11, sa.2, 2015 (SSCI) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 11 Sayı: 2
  • Basım Tarihi: 2015
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1111/ijet.12064
  • Dergi Adı: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus
  • Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

A set of sufficiency conditions is presented for Walrasian equilibrium to be equivalent to voluntary and efficient allocations. An important corollary of this equivalence is that voluntary trade in non-clearing markets, which is omnipresent in all market economies, is inefficient. Moreover, our assumptions generalize all the results on the Pareto-efficiency properties of disequilibrium. This generalization also shows that the inefficiency of disequilibrium is germane to the existence of Walrasian equilibrium.